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■ Abstract Although best known for cooperation, insect societies also manifest
many potential conﬂicts among individuals. These conﬂicts involve both direct repro-
duction by individuals and manipulation of the reproduction of colony members. Here
we review ﬁve major areas of reproductive conﬂict in insect societies: (a)s ex alloca-
tion, (b) queen rearing, (c) male rearing, (d) queen-worker caste fate, and (e) breeding
conﬂicts among totipotent adults. For each area we discuss the basis for conﬂict (po-
tential conﬂict), whether conﬂict is expressed (actual conﬂict), whose interests prevail
(conﬂict outcome), and the factors that reduce colony-level costs of conﬂict (conﬂict
resolution), such as factors that cause workers to work rather than to lay eggs. Re-
productive conﬂicts are widespread, sometimes having dramatic effects on the colony.
However, three key factors (kinship, coercion, and constraint) typically combine to
limit the effects of reproductive conﬂict and often lead to complete resolution.
INTRODUCTION
Observationofaninsectsocietyreadilyrevealscooperation.Workersactivelywork
for the good of the colony as they forage, guard, build, and nurse. Detailed study
reinforces this impression. Workers cooperate to forage and defend by means
of sophisticated communication signals (56, 113). In some species cooperation
includes extreme altruism, with defending workers sacriﬁcing their lives as they
deploy detachable stings or chemical-ﬁlled exploding abdomens to deter intruders
(56, 113). However, sophisticated cooperation in one area of social life does not
preclude conﬂict in another. Egg laying, brood rearing, and queen-worker caste
development, for example, can all be associated with signiﬁcant conﬂict. Indeed,
potentialconﬂictininsectsocietiesisinevitablebecauseinsectsocietiesarealmost
alwaysfamilies,notclones.Nevertheless,conﬂictininsectcoloniesislessobvious
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thancooperation,whichsuggeststhatconﬂictmayoftenberesolvedorweak.What
factors enable insect societies to resolve their conﬂicts? In this review, we discuss
the large body of work devoted to this question, which has focused primarily on
the eusocial Hymenoptera (bees, ants, and wasps).
INCLUSIVE FITNESS THEORY: EXPLANATION
FOR BOTH COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
Inclusive ﬁtness theory (47) provides a general explanation for reproductive divi-
sionoflaborineusocialinsects,withsomeindividualsforgoingdirectreproduction
to help rear the offspring of other colony members. The intermediate levels of re-
latednesstypicallyfoundininsectsocietiesprovideastrongincentiveforaltruism,
and kin are also close at hand and can readily be helped by defense or food col-
lection. Ironically, the same theory also led to the realization that insect societies
are subject to internal conﬂicts over reproduction. Even when family relatedness
is at its highest, kinship is insufﬁcient to eliminate all incentive for individual self-
ishness. This would require a relatedness of 1. At lower relatedness levels, social
groups are vulnerable to exploitation by group members who free ride on group
resources (51, 61). The challenge for evolutionary biology is to understand how
groups can prevent or reduce such exploitation. This problem is a general one,
as it applies not just to insect societies but across all levels of biological organi-
zation, from intragenomic conﬂicts (57) to conﬂicts among partner organisms in
multispeciesmutualisms(71,109).Insectsocietiesarearguablytheleadingmodel
systemforinvestigatingthispuzzle,andinclusiveﬁtnesstheoryhasprovidedgreat
insight into the factors that can cause or resolve conﬂict in their colonies. In fact,
while some of the conﬂicts that occur in insect societies can also be described
using a multilevel selection approach (64b, 134, 136), it is fair to say that most
of the insight has come from inclusive ﬁtness theory. Hence, all discussion in this
paper will be couched in inclusive ﬁtness terms. For those wishing to see analyses
worked out using an equivalent multilevel selection approach, readers are referred
to References 134 and 136.
Empirical study of conﬂict within insect societies began with Trivers & Hare
(125), who used inclusive ﬁtness theory to show that there is potential conﬂict
between mother queen and daughter workers over the rearing of young males
versus queens in eusocial Hymenoptera. Because of their haplodiploid genetics
(females are diploid, males are haploid) (17), female hymenopteran workers are
three times more related to full sisters (r = 0.75) than to brothers (r = 0.25),
whereas the queen is equally related to sons and daughters (r = 0.5). As a result,
the queen optimum is an even allocation ratio, whereas the worker optimum is
biased three to one in favor of females. Trivers & Hare’s analysis (125) supported
the prediction of female bias, although later studies have shown that female bias
is frequently less than three to one (8, 54). The Trivers & Hare study was of great
importance in providing support for inclusive ﬁtness theory, and their conclusions23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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undermined the traditional view of an insect society as a harmonious entity with a
rulingqueen.Instead,theantqueenevencametobeseenasfarmedbytheworkers
as an egg source (31).
Sex allocation is only one of several major areas of reproduction in insect
societies.Researchershavedocumentedconﬂictovermalerearing(13,49,95,125,
136, 139), queen rearing (47, 60, 97, 124, 127), female caste fate (18, 106, 138,
140, 141), and, in societies lacking morphologically distinct queens and workers,
queenstatus(76)andthechoicebetweenhelpingandnestingindependently(103).
All conﬂicts revolve around reproduction, especially breeding, egg laying, and
brood rearing, and often involve actions that change the balance between direct,
personal reproduction and indirect reproduction by other colony members. For
example, workers, and females in general, can attempt to increase their personal
reproduction by laying eggs (13, 49, 136, 139), by developing into a queen rather
than into a worker (18, 106, 140), or, in species without morphological castes, by
overthrowingtheexistingqueen(76,77)ornestingindependently(103).However,
workers may also enhance their inclusive ﬁtness by shifting reproduction toward
a more valuable class of relatives (42a) such as by favoring sisters over brothers
(125) or queen’s sons over workers’ sons (95).
Matingisrarelyasourceofintracolonyconﬂictbecausematingisrarelypartof
social life. Queens mate when young and store sufﬁcient sperm to last their whole
life. As a result, male-male conﬂict over mating, which can be a major feature in
vertebrate societies, is generally absent within an insect society, although mating
conﬂicts do occur outside the colony (9). One example of within-nest mating
conﬂict occurs in Cardiocondyla ants, which have males of two morphological
types. Worker-like wingless males mate inside the nest and ﬁght and kill each
other with their sharp mandibles. Winged males mate mainly outside the nest and
evade physical competition with the wingless males by chemically mimicking
females (26).
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY CONFLICT RESOLUTION?
Potential conﬂict is any difference in the reproductive optima of individuals or
groups within a society (100). Thus, there is potential worker-queen conﬂict over
colony sex allocation ratio, but there is no worker-worker conﬂict because all
workershavethesameoptimum.Actualconﬂictisovertconﬂictamongindividuals
withdifferentoptima(100).Forexample,thereisactualconﬂictwhentheworkers
kill some of the queen’s male offspring to cause a female-biased sex ratio.
Thefocusofthisreviewisconﬂictresolution,notconﬂictingeneral,whichhas
already been excellently reviewed elsewhere (6, 16a, 17, 28, 93, 100). Our goal
is to identify factors that are responsible for reducing conﬂict from hypothetical
worst-casescenariostothelevelsactuallyseen.Consider,forexample,theconﬂict
over whether female larvae develop into queens or workers (18, 106, 140) (Box
S1; follow the Supplemental Material link from the Annual Reviews home page23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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at http://www.annualreviews.org). Here, the worst-case scenario is that all female
larvaeselﬁshlydevelopintoqueens.However,theadultworkersandqueenbeneﬁt
most from raising only as many new queens as the colony needs to reproduce (18,
106,140).Inthisexample,theoptimumofindividuallarvae,whichresultsinmany
excess queens being reared, and the optimum of the adult workers, which results
in zero excess queens, are both biologically plausible conﬂict outcomes. However,
only the latter results in conﬂict resolution. We deﬁne conﬂict resolution as an
outcomethatreducestoalowleveltheproportionofthecolony’sresourcesthatare
wastedintheconﬂict.Resolutionisnotnecessarilythesameaswinning.Aconﬂict
may be won at high cost. In Melipona bees, the female larvae win the conﬂict with
the workers over their adult caste, with an excess developing into queens (135,
138). This diminishes the workforce and reduces colony reproduction (138).
A large body of research, known as skew theory, has focused on how reproduc-
tion is partitioned within societies (103). We do not focus on skew here because
it is concerned principally with the conﬂict outcome rather than resolution. That
is, both high-skew and low-skew (egalitarian) societies can be associated with
well-resolved conﬂicts. For example, in caste fate conﬂict the colony optimum
is often one of high skew, in which few individuals follow the selﬁsh strategy
of becoming a queen and most work for the good of the colony (136, 140). In
other situations, however, a low-skew society may maximize productivity if, for
instance, this minimizes aggression (103).
KINSHIP, COERCION, AND CONSTRAINT
Many factors can affect whether reproductive conﬂicts are resolved in insect
colonies.Wesuggestthatallarecombinationsofthreeunderlyingfactors:kinship,
coercion, and constraint.
Kinship refers not only to the relatedness among individuals but also to their
familial relationships, such as mother-daughter or sister-sister. Kinship has sev-
eral important basic effects (Figure 1). Because relatedness among individuals is
typically lower than 1, there is potential conﬂict within insect societies. However,
dependingonkinstructure,theremaynotbepotentialconﬂictinparticularareasof
colony reproduction (Figure 1). For example, there is no conﬂict over queen rear-
ing in a society with a single queen mated to a single male because all workers are
equallyrelatedtoallnewqueens.However,thereisqueen-workerconﬂictoversex
allocationinahymenopteransocietyofthiskinstructurebutnotinatermitesociety
becausetermiteworkersarediploidandequallyrelatedtomaleandfemalesiblings.
Where potential conﬂict does occur, kinship can affect resolution in multiple
ways (Figure 1). Most fundamentally, low relatedness makes wasteful conﬂicts
morelikelybecausethecostofconﬂictfallsuponmoredistantkin(136,138,140).
Fore xample, in male-rearing conﬂict, low relatedness favors more egg laying by
workers (136) (Box S1). However, low relatedness caused by multiple paternity
can also select for workers to police each other, because under multiple paternity23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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Figure1 Potentialconﬂictinhymenopteransocietiesheadedbyasinglequeenmated
to a single male (left column)o rfour males (right column). The outer rectangle repre-
sentsalltheworkers.Theinnerrectangles(rightcolumn)representworkersofdifferent
fathers.Arrowsrepresentconﬂicts,andthewidthofthearrowistherelativestrengthof
theconﬂictinrelationtootherarrowsforthatparticularconﬂict.W,individualworker;
Q, queen; T, totipotent larval females.23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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workers are more closely related to the queen’s sons (brothers, r = 0.25) than to
otherworkers’sons(amixoffull-andhalf-nephews,r<0.25)(95).Hence,subtle
differencesinkinshipcanprovideconditionsthatselectonepartytocoerceanother
(95, 102). Coercion is the second major factor that can help resolve conﬂict, as it
may prevent individuals from acting selﬁshly or reduce the beneﬁt to do so (102,
134) (Figure 2). Nevertheless, coercion is not necessarily stable in the long run,
since there will still be selection on individuals to evade coercion, and there are
good examples of this occurring (Figure 3).
Finally, conﬂict may also be resolved through constraint. That is, individuals
may just not have the possibility to act selﬁshly, or can do so only at very high
cost (64b, 134). Coercion can often lead to constraints. For example, in the honey
bee, female larvae in worker cells are coerced to become workers because they
are given insufﬁcient food to develop as queens. Thus, coercion causes constraints
on the caste into which female larvae can develop. However, constraints can also
be independent of coercion, for example, when they refer to genetic or other
mechanistic constraints.
SEX ALLOCATION
Basis for Conﬂict
Potential conﬂict over sex allocation in hymenopteran societies is predominantly
betweentheworkersasacollectiveandthemotherqueen(Figure1).Inapanmictic
population with colonies headed by a single, once-mated queen and no worker
reproduction, the optimum investment in females (young queens) versus males
is 1:1 for the mother queen and 3:1 for the workers. These differences result
fromhaplodiploidy(17,28,125),whichcausestheworkerstobethreetimesmore
relatedtofull-sisters(r = 0.75)thantobrothers(r = 0.25).Asinnormaldiploidy,
thequeenisequallyrelatedtohersonsanddaughters.Thereisnopotentialconﬂict
intermites,astheyarediploid(125).Thereisalsonopotentialconﬂictbetweenthe
motherqueenandtheworkerswhenthequeenmatesmanytimesbecauseoffspring
workers are then equally related to males (brothers, r = 0.25) and young queens
(half-sisters, r = 0.25) (87, 88). Potential conﬂict is also absent when all the
malesinthepopulationaresonsofworkers(87,125).Althoughobservedlevelsof
multiplemating(12,117)orworkerreproduction(49,139)(Figure4)canapproach
these extremes, considerable potential conﬂict over sex allocation remains in most
species (87, 88).
Is There Actual Conﬂict?
Trivers & Hare (125) found that ant sex ratios were signiﬁcantly female biased
by approximately 3:1 (8, 17, 80). A later reanalysis of the Trivers & Hare dataset,
accountingfordifferencesinthecaloriccontentofmalesandqueens(8),however,
showed that female bias was actually less than 3:1 and thus intermediate between
the queen and worker optima (16a, 17, 125). This is consistent with an ongoingCONFLICTS IN INSECT SOCIETIES C-1
See legend on next page
HI-RES-EN51-24-Ratnieks.qxd  11/23/05  4:47 PM  Page 1C-2 RATNIEKS ■ FOSTER ■ WENSELEERS
Figure 2   Examples of coercion resolving conflicts in insect societies. (a) Worker
policing in the honey bee, A. mellifera. (b) A worker lays an egg and another one
polices the egg in the saxon wasp, D. saxonica. (c) Worker policing in the ant 
C. floridanus. (d)T he queen (left) about to police a worker-laid egg in the bumble
bee  Bombus ephippiatus. (e) Differential feeding of worker-destined (left) and
queen-destined (right) larvae in the honey bee, A. mellifera. ( f)Aggression toward a
worker with active ovaries in the queenless ant Harpegnathos saltator.
(g) Punishment of a worker that attempted to overthrow the alpha breeder in the
queenless ant Dinoponera quadriceps. (h) Mutilation of thoracic appendages pre-
vents newly eclosed workers from mating in the queenless ant Diacamma pallidum.
Photos are by F.L.W. Ratnieks (a,e), K.R. Foster (b), J. Liebig (c, f),J.I. Cuadriello-
Aguilar (d), T. Monnin (g), and T. Wenseleers (h).
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Figure 3   Examples in which coercion is either evaded or not possible, resulting in
overt actual conflict. (a) An anarchistic worker honey bee lays an egg that mimics the
smell of queen-laid eggs and thereby escapes from being policed. (b) Parasitic Cape
bee workers, A. mellifera capensis, also lay eggs that are not policed in colonies of
their host, A. mellifera scutellata,r esulting in the accumulation of a great excess of
Cape bee eggs. (c) Opened brood comb of the stingless bee Schwarziana
quadripunctata showing two females who selfishly developed as dwarf queens (*);
the large royal cell at the periphery contains a normal-sized queen (x). (d)L i k e nor-
mal queens (top), dwarf  Schwarziana queens (bottom) can successfully head a
colony. (e) A great excess of females selfishly developed as queens (*) in this opened
brood comb of the stingless bee Melipona subnitida. (f) An excess Melipona queen
is killed by a worker (top). (g) In the social gall aphid Pemphigus obesinymphae, sol-
diers of one gall invade those of another and then selfishly develop into alate repro-
ductives. (h) In the drywood termite Cryptotermes domesticus, individuals can deter-
mine their own caste because nymphs feed by themselves on the wood that forms
their nest cavity. If the royal pair is removed, a great excess of individuals develop
into replacement reproductives, but after fierce fights only a single pair (center)
survives. Photos are by B.P. Oldroyd (a), S.J. Martin (b), T. Wenseleers (c–f),
N.A. Moran (g), and J. Korb (h). 
HI-RES-EN51-24-Ratnieks.qxd  11/23/05  4:47 PM  Page 423 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
CONFLICTS IN INSECT SOCIETIES 587
Figure 4 A signiﬁcantly smaller proportion of the adult males are workers’ sons in
species in which workers are related more to the queen’s sons than to other workers’
sons (139). This is consistent with worker policing theory (95), which predicts that
workers should eliminate other workers’ sons when they are related more to those of
the queen. This trend is also signiﬁcant if phylogenetic nonindependence is controlled
for (139). Data are from Reference 49, with additions and corrections as in Reference
139.
conﬂict in which both the queen and the workers possess some power over sex
allocation (72, 105). In some species, allocation less extreme than 75% female
may also be compatible with full worker control if the worker optimum is reduced
by multiple mating by queens (87, 88), multiple related queens (97, 96), or worker
production of males (87, 125).
Direct evidence for actual sex-ratio conﬂict comes from studies showing that
the sex ratio among pupae or adults is more female biased than the sex ratio
among the eggs laid by the queen (4, 48, 62, 89, 122), implying that not all
male eggs are reared. Sex-allocation conﬂict has also been well documented in
species with split sex ratios, in which some colonies raise mostly males and others
raise mostly females (16a, 93, 121, 122). In the wood ants Formica exsecta and23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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F. truncorum, for example, queens can be singly or multiply mated (121, 122),
and workers enhance their inclusive ﬁtness by female specialization in colonies
headed by a singly mated queen and by male specialization in colonies headed
by a multiply mated queen (10, 96, 121, 122, 123). In F. exsecta, there was no
difference in the sex ratio of the eggs laid by singly mated and multiply mated
queens (122). However, the pupal sex ratio was signiﬁcantly more female biased
than the egg sex ratio in colonies headed by a singly mated queen (122). Evidence
for actual conﬂict was also found in the ant Leptothorax acervorum,i nwhich
single-queen colonies have a more female-biased sex allocation than multiple-
queen colonies, which the workers achieve by rearing more female eggs as queens
thanasworkers(48).Finally,severalotherants,bees,andwaspsalsoshowsplitsex
ratios, and in 19 of the 25 documented cases, sex ratios correlated with relatedness
(16a). Again, this provides strong evidence for actual conﬂict and for worker
control.
In a minority of cases, ant sex ratios have been found to be almost even, for ex-
ample, in slave-making ants (14, 80, 125) and in the ant Pheidole desertorum (54).
In these cases, the queen appears to win the sex ratio conﬂict. In bumble bees, sex
ratios may also be close to even or male biased, indicating queen control (16, 32a).
Conﬂict Resolution
Although actual conﬂict over sex allocation is widespread, the conﬂict typically
does not reach a worst-case scenario in which all colony resources are wasted
in the conﬂict. As in all conﬂicts (Box S1), relatedness among colony members
contributes to at least a partial resolution of sex-allocation conﬂict. However,
relatedness costs only partially resolve sex-allocation conﬂict (105). The colony-
levelcosttheconﬂictingpartiescantoleratedependsupontheoverallsexallocation
ratio. At the two extremes of 50% and 75% female allocation, the nonoptimum
party, whether queen or workers, can beneﬁt if three units of allocation in the less-
valuablesexistradedforoneunitofthemorevaluable.Thisfavorsongoingconﬂict
because the more the sex allocation ratio diverges from one party’s optimum, the
greater the incentive to manipulate the sex ratio and the greater the colony cost
that can be tolerated in doing this (96, 105).
Coercion and constraint may help to resolve conﬂict if one party has complete
poweroversexallocation.Mixedpowerseemslikelyinmanybutnotallsituations.
The queen plays her hand ﬁrst via the eggs she lays, and in some taxa such as
Pheidole ants, worker-queen caste determination begins in the egg stage under the
inﬂuence of hormones sequestered there by the queen (32, 54). In that case, the
queen may limit the number of queen-potentiated eggs (32, 54). The workers play
second and can inﬂuence sex allocation by trading off queen rearing for worker
(32, 48, 87) or male rearing (4, 48, 62, 87, 89, 122).
Worker control is unlikely to completely resolve conﬂict because workers can-
notaffectthesexoftheeggslaidbythequeen.However,thecolonycosttoworker
manipulationofthesexratiomaystillbeminimalifitresultsonlyineggsoryoung
larvae being killed. Research on Lasius niger ants has shown that young larvae are23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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kept in piles according to sex and age, indicating that workers can determine their
sex even as young larvae (58). However, in other species a lack of information
may mean workers are unable to do so (79, 81, 82). For example, in the wood ant
F. exsecta, there is evidence that excess males are eaten late in larval development
(23), although it is unclear if this is due to the inability of the workers to determine
the sex of young larvae or because male larvae function as a food store or as a way
of making it possible to increase total reproductive investment if food is abundant
(23).
The conﬂict can be resolved if the queen has complete power. Lack of worker
powerisstronglysuggestedinslave-makingants,asbroodrearingiscarriedoutby
allospeciﬁc slaves and allocation ratios are close to 50% female (14, 80, 125). The
queen can also gain power by producing either an exclusively male or exclusively
female brood with equal probability (54, 86a). This occurs in the ants Pheidole
desertorum (54) and Solenopsis invicta (90) and prevents actual conﬂict, as in the
male-specialist colonies the workers do not have the power to cause a female-
biased sex ratio because of a shortage of female eggs, and in the female-specialist
colonies the queen and workers both agree on producing a female-biased sex ratio
(54,86a).Consistentwiththisview,inP. desertorum,thepopulationsexallocation
ratio is close to 50% female, in line with the queen’s optimum (54). In S. invicta,
however, the population sex allocation ratio lies between the queen and worker
optima,indicatingthatqueencontrolisincomplete(90).Anotherstrategyofqueen
control occurs in bumble bees. Here, the queen typically lays male eggs before
female eggs (protandry) (16, 18a). Such a temporal segregation in the rearing of
males and queens reduces the opportunity for sex-ratio biasing and results in sex
ratios that are close to even, in line with the queen’s optimum (16, 18a).
QUEEN REARING
Basis for Conﬂict
Potential conﬂict among the workers over queen rearing occurs when there are
unequal degrees of relatedness from individual workers to different queens (47,
60, 97, 124, 127). This occurs when the queen is mated to more than one male
or when there is more than one mother queen. Hymenopteran colonies headed by
a single queen mated to a single male (12, 115) or termite colonies headed by
a single royal pair have no potential conﬂict over queen rearing. When multiple
queens occur there is conﬂict between these queens over queen rearing (32).
Is There Actual Conﬂict?
Even though hymenopteran workers are related more to full-sisters (r = 0.75)
than to half-sisters (r = 0.25), there is little evidence that full-sisters are favored
(19, 60, 124, 130). Possible nepotism in queen rearing has been looked for in the
honeybeeinallstagesofqueenrearing,fromeggsandlarvae(127)toyoungadult
queens (22, 124), and the consensus is that it is weak or nonexistent (19).23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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As with the honey bee, most studies of ant, wasp, or stingless bee societies
headed by multiple queens have failed to ﬁnd nepotism. Nepotistic interactions
between workers and queens were not found in studies of the ants Formica ar-
gentea (114), Camponotus planatus (21), Camponotus yamaokai (111), Gnamp-
togenys striatula (7), or Leptothorax acervorum (53), the wasps Parachatergus
colobopterus (118) or Polistes carolina (119), or the stingless bee Melipona bi-
color (2). One exception is the wood ant Formica fusca,i nwhich workers did
preferentially rear more-related female larvae (50). The colonies used, however,
were rearing only workers. Nepotism has been suggested to occur also in the
polygynous termite Schedorhinotermes lamanianus,i nwhich foraging columns
tended to assort by kin (59).
Conﬂict Resolution
That nepotism in queen rearing is weak at best is at ﬁrst surprising given the
potential threefold advantage in inclusive ﬁtness to a hymenopteran worker who
rears full-sisters over half-sisters—the same advantage that a worker obtains from
causing a female-biased sex ratio (see above). Kinship alone cannot explain the
apparent absence of nepotistic queen rearing, especially as multiple paternity or
multiple queens necessarily reduce kinship.
Nepotism may be rare because of errors in discriminating full-sisters from
half-sisters (60, 97) (Box S2; follow the Supplemental Material link from the
AnnualReviewshomepageathttp://www.annualreviews.org).Recognitionerrors
diminish or even eliminate any beneﬁt of attempted nepotism (97). Empirical
data suggest that recognition information may indeed be limiting. Workers of
differentpatrilinesinsingle-queencoloniesoftheantFormicatruncorumcouldnot
reliably be distinguished on the basis of cuticular hydrocarbons using coupled gas
chromatography-massspectroscopy(11).However,honeybeeworkersofdifferent
patrilines could be distinguished (3). Cuticular hydrocarbons from Polistinae and
Vespinaewaspsfailedtodistinguishreliablyamongpatrilinesbutcoulddistinguish
among nestmate workers of different matrilines (30).
Theory shows reasons for information constraint (97). Discrimination requires
considerable underlying genetic variation if full-sisters are to be recognized by
being more similar to self than to half-sisters. However, the act of discrimina-
tion itself selects against rare recognition alleles, thereby reducing information
and increasing errors (97). Other constraints may also be important. For exam-
ple, full-sister versus half-sister recognition is more difﬁcult if odors are mixed
between individuals (e.g., among female ant larvae in a pile) or if within-colony
cues are homogenized by selection for between-colony recognition (21). Finally,
individuals may deliberately confuse or reduce the information they produce (60).
Fore xample, if workers identify more-related queens by possession of certain
cues, queens beneﬁt from producing all possible cues, thereby removing kin in-
formation. However, this would not work if workers identiﬁed queens by an exact
matching.23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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MALE REARING
Basis for Conﬂict
Male production is subject to great potential conﬂict in hymenopteran societies
because workers can generally lay unfertilized male eggs (13). Usually, repro-
ductive workers carry out little work and worker reproduction can reduce colony
productivity, causing a “tragedy of the commons” (51, 136). The relatedness ad-
vantage of worker reproduction stems from haplodiploidy, which causes workers
to be related less to brothers (r = 0.25) than to sons (r = 0.5) and enables them
to lay male eggs even without the ability to mate or store sperm (24). (In a small
numberofspecies,workerscanalsoproducefemaleeggsparthenogenetically;see
Reference133.)Workermaleproductionresultsinconﬂictwiththemotherqueen,
as she is related more to her own sons (r = 0.5) than to workers’ sons (grandsons,
r = 0.25) (Figure 1). The queen, therefore, is selected to prevent workers from
successfully reproducing (“queen policing”) (95) (Figure 2d), and the workers are
selected to replace the queen’s sons. In annual societies, workers may gain control
over male production by killing their mother queen (matricide) before the end of
the colony cycle (15, 40). Worker reproduction can also involve conﬂict among
workers, speciﬁcally between individual workers and the workers as a collective
(95). For example, when the colony is headed by a multiply mated queen, workers
are on average related more to the queen’s sons (brothers, r = 0.25) than to other
workers’ sons (full- and half-nephews, r < 0.25) (95). In that case, workers are
selected to prevent each other from reproducing (“worker policing”) (95).
Is There Actual Conﬂict?
Potential conﬂict over male parentage is almost universal. In only seven genera
of ants, Atta, Linepithema, Monomorium, Pheidole, Pheidologeton, Tetramorium,
and Solenopsis (86), and three genera of stingless bees, Duckeola, Frieseomelitta,
and Tetragonula (29), are workers fully sterile by lacking functional ovaries,
thereby resolving male-rearing conﬂict. In other species, actual conﬂict over male
parentageisfrequentlyobserved.Inaforthcomingstudyofeightspeciesofwasps,
for example, between 1% and 20% of the workers in colonies with a queen had
active ovaries, and between 31% and 81% of the male eggs were laid by workers
(T. Wenseleers & F. L. W. Ratnieks, manuscript submitted). Selective policing of
worker-laid eggs (40, 95, 132, 134, 136, 143), however, frequently reduces the
rearing of workers’ sons (49). In the honey bee, 7% of the male eggs are laid by
workers (129), but only 1 adult male per 1,000 is a worker’s son (128). The degree
of actual conﬂict varies greatly. In an analysis of 90 species, the proportion of
males that were workers’ sons averaged at 12% and ranged from 0% to 100% (49,
139). Matricide has been found in annual societies of Vespidae wasps (15, 40)
and bumble bees (15). In these and other species, the death of the queen results in
widespread worker production of males (13).23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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Conﬂict Resolution
Two mainfactorsaffecttheresolutionofconﬂictovermalerearing:relatednessand
coercion of workers in the form of the policing of their eggs (Figure 2). The effect
ofrelatednesscanworkintwooppositedirections.Intheabsenceofpolicing,high
relatedness favors fewer workers to lay eggs (13, 136). Although this may help to
resolve conﬂict, the effect is limited because, even with high relatedness, many
of the workers are selected to lay eggs (14% to 54% with paternity frequencies
ranging from 1 to 10) (136) (Box S1). Evidence that lower relatedness leads to
more worker reproduction occurs in two bumble bees, Bombus terrestris and B.
occidentalis,inwhichworkersthathaveenteredunrelatedcoloniesaremorelikely
to reproduce (6a, 68).
Conversely, as discussed above, low relatedness caused by multiple paternity
can also help to resolve conﬂict by favoring worker policing (95). Several lines
of evidence support this prediction. First, worker policing has been discovered
in three species of Apis honey bees (46, 85, 101) (Figure 2a) and the common
wasp Vespula vulgaris (39), in which queens are multiply mated (115). Second, in
the saxon wasp Dolichovespula saxonica, genetic analysis indicates that worker
policing occurs in colonies with a multiply mated queen, but not in those headed
by a singly mated one (38) (Figure 2b). Finally, a comparative analysis of male
parentageacross90speciesofsocialHymenopterashowedthatsigniﬁcantlyfewer
males were workers’ sons when workers were related more to the queen’s sons
(139) (Figure 4). In 75 species in which workers were more related to workers’
sons,anaverageof14%ofthemaleswereworkers’sons.Bycontrast,in15species
in which workers were related more to the queen’s sons, an average of only 0.2%
of the males were workers’ sons (Figure 4). This strongly suggests that worker
policing was favored on relatedness grounds. A previous study (49) did not ﬁnd
thistrendbutwasbasedonasmallerdataset.Furtherevidencethatlowrelatedness
reducesqueen-workerconﬂictovermaleproductioncomesfromdatashowingthat
queen loss (matricide) is more frequent in Vespinae wasp species in which queens
are predominantly singly mated (40). In addition, matricide occurs in bumble bees
(15), which typically have singly mated queens (12, 115).
Recent research indicates that worker policing may be widespread, as it occurs
in 29 species (Table S1; follow the Supplemental Material link from the Annual
Reviewshomepageathttp://www.annualreviews.org).Interestingly,someofthese
specieshavequeensthattypicallymateonlyonce,forexample,theantCamponotus
ﬂoridanus (33) (Figure 2c) and the hornet Vespa crabro (37). However, in such
species worker policing can also be favored if the killing of worker-laid eggs helps
theworkerscauseamorefemale-biasedsexallocationratio(41),ifitincreasestotal
colony reproduction (95), or if it gives policing workers a greater opportunity to
reproduce directly (“selﬁsh” policing) (110, 143). Hence, many factors can select
for worker policing and may together help to resolve conﬂict.
There is also abundant evidence that the queen may police worker-laid eggs
or aggress egg-laying workers (Table S1). Queen policing is known to occur in23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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36 species (Table S1) and is particularly common in small-colony species, in-
cluding Halictidae bees (73), bumble bees (43), and small-colony Polistine and
Vespinaewasps(110,132,143)(TableS1).Anotherqueenstrategymaybetomark
her eggs with pheromone in order to facilitate worker policing (95). Consistent
chemical differences between queen-laid and worker-laid eggs have indeed been
found in both the honey bee, Apis mellifera, and the ant C. ﬂoridanus (33, 70).
Both queen and worker policing have several consequences for conﬂict res-
olution. First, they reduce the proportion of workers’ sons that are reared. Here,
workerpolicingistypicallymoreeffectivethanqueenpolicing,becauseitisharder
for the queen to control the whole colony (95). For example, in the honey bee,
worker policing is 98% effective and results in only 0.1% of the adult males being
workers’ sons (129). In contrast, in three wasp species, Polistes chinensis, Vespula
rufa, and Dolichovespula sylvestris, queen policing only results in the killing of
69%,39%,and27%oftheeggslaidbyworkers(110,132,143).Asecondeffectof
policing is that it reduces the beneﬁt for workers to lay eggs in the ﬁrst place. The-
ory shows that this favors worker self-restraint (134, 136). In a forthcoming study
ofninespecies(eightVespidaewaspsandthehoneybee)weshowthatthispredic-
tion is supported: Fewer workers attempt to reproduce in species in which polic-
ing is more effective (T. Wenseleers & F. L. W. Ratnieks, manuscript submitted)
(Figure5).Thispreventiveeffectofpolicingcanresultinahighlyeffectiveconﬂict
resolution. For example, in the absence of policing, theory predicts that 54% of
the worker honey bees in a colony with a queen would be selected to reproduce
(Box S1). However, effective policing reduces the beneﬁt of worker reproduction
to such an extent that, in fact, only around 0.1% of the honey bee workers acti-
vate their ovaries. The vast majority work to make the colony more productive
(98). Even with effective policing, however, potential conﬂict over male produc-
tion does not disappear, as there is selection on individual egg-laying workers to
evade policing. Evidence for this comes from the discovery of anarchistic and
parasitic Cape honey bee workers that lay eggs which evade policing, presumably
by chemically mimicking those of the queen (5, 69) (Figure 3a,b). Nevertheless,
anarchistic colonies are rare, possibly because the genetics of anarchy depends on
multiple genetic loci, each with a cost (5).
CASTE FATE CONFLICT
Basis for Conﬂict
Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of eusocial insects is the presence of mor-
phologicallydistinctreproductiveandworkercastes(144).Workersarelessfecund
and are unable to mate or found a colony. This inequality leads to potential con-
ﬂict because each individual obtains greater inclusive ﬁtness by developing as a
queen (or king) rather than as a worker (18, 106, 140) (Box S1). Theory predicts
that individuals should attempt to become reproductives even if this causes fewer23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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Figure 5 More effective policing results in fewer workers attempting to reproduce,
as shown by this comparative data set of eight Vespidae wasps and the honey bee, Apis
mellifera (T. Wenseleers & F. L. W. Ratnieks, manuscript submitted). This observed
trend closely matches theoretical predictions (134, 136).
workerstobereared,therebyreducingcolonyproductivity(99,106,140)(BoxS1)
(Figure 6). As in the conﬂict over male rearing, this may create a tragedy of the
commons(51),inwhichindividualselﬁshnessiscostlytoall(138,140).However,
even while selected to be selﬁsh themselves, each colony member also beneﬁts
from attempting to coerce others to become workers, thereby preventing an over-
production of reproductives (140).
Is There Actual Conﬂict?
Potential conﬂict over caste fate is almost universal in insect societies. However,
actual conﬂict is relatively rare and restricted to species in which immature indi-
viduals can determine their own caste fate (6, 18, 140) (Figure 6). In Melipona
bees, female larvae can determine their own caste fate because queens and work-
ers are the same size and are reared in identical, sealed cells (34, 63). In line with23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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Figure 6 The logic of caste fate conﬂict. When a colony is rearing both queens
and workers at the same time, a female larva is better off to be reared as a queen.
However, the adult workers will normally beneﬁt if fewer larvae develop into queens
thanisoptimalforthelarvaethemselves.Severalfactorsinﬂuencethebalanceofpower
between larvae and adults.
prediction, a large percentage (5% to 25%) of the females develop into queens
(63, 77a, 138) (Figure 3e), a vast overproduction given that only a few queens are
needed for reproduction by swarming. Excess queens are killed by the workers
soon after they emerge from their cells (64, 135) (Figure 3f). Similar evidence for
actual conﬂict occurs in the lower termite families Kalotermitidae and Termopsi-
dae, in which nymphs can control their own caste development because they feed
directly from the wood that lines the inside of their nest cavity (131). Upon loss
of the royal pair, a great excess of workers (who are immature instars) molt into
replacement reproductives (78, 140). For example, in Cryptotermes domesticus
and Kalotermes ﬂavicollis,u pt o58% and 42% of all nymphs molt into replace-
ment reproductives, even though only a single pair (male and female) is needed.
Same-sexﬁghtingamongthereproductivesthenensuesuntilonlyasinglemember
of each sex remains (78) (Figure 3h).
In most other social Hymenoptera and in the advanced termites, actual caste
fate conﬂict does not occur because larvae cannot determine their own caste fate.
Instead, workers determine the caste fate of larvae by different feeding regimes,
and queens or reproductives are produced in proportion to colony needs (18, 140,
144) (Figures 6 and 7). Swarm-founding species such as honey bees, trigonine
stingless bees, and army ants, for example, generally rear queens sparingly (18,
140).Honeybeecoloniestypicallyproduceonlyapproximately10to25queens,in
preparation for swarming or to supersede a failing mother queen, but may produce
150,000 workers per year (145) (Figure 2e). Similarly, in the trigonine stingless
bees Tetragonisca angustula and Trigona ventralis, only 0.02% (126) and 0.08%
(25) of the females are reared as queens, and in the army ant, Eciton burchelli,
only about 1 queen is reared per 50,000 workers (112).23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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Figure 7 The roles of kinship and coercion in resolving caste fate conﬂict. In four
speciesofbeesthatfoundcoloniesbyswarms,theworst-casescenarioisthatallfemale
larvae develop into queens. Kinship alone is sufﬁcient to diminish the proportion that
shoulddevelopintoqueensto∼20%inthethreespeciesofstinglessbees(M.beecheii,
S. quadripunctata, and N. melanocera) and to 54% in the honey bee, A. mellifera.
Kinship is less effective in conﬂict resolution in honey bees, as multiple mating by
the queen leads to lower relatedness among female offspring (r = 0.3) than in the
stingless bees (r = 0.75), in which queens mate with a single male. In A. mellifera and
N. melanocera, the workers fully coerce the female larvae by the use of specialized
worker(small)andqueen(large)cellssothatfeedingcontrolcanpreventexcessqueens
from being reared. In S. quadripunctata, feeding control is not fully effective, as some
of the larvae reared in small cells develop into dwarf queens instead of workers. In M.
beecheii, all larvae are reared in the same-sized cells. Coercion by food control is not
possible and many excess queens are reared.
Caste fate conﬂict is most easily seen in swarm-founding species, because very
few queens are required to swarm effectively and excess queens are killed (140).
Actual caste fate conﬂict may also occur in species in which queens found nests
without workers (106). However, it is much harder to demonstrate (108) because
independently founding species typically rear many queens and would not be
selected to kill excess queens once reared.23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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Conﬂict Resolution
Two majorfactorscontributetotheresolutionofcastefateconﬂict:relatednessand
whether larvae can be coerced to become workers. High relatedness reduces the
incentive for individual selﬁshness and therefore lowers the proportion of larvae
that is selected to become reproductives (Figure 1) (Box S1). This prediction is
supported by a comparison of queen production in four Melipona species in which
kinship patterns differed as a result of variable male production by workers (138).
Increasedmaleproductionbyworkersraisedtherelatednessbetweenfemalelarvae
and the males reared and was associated with a decreased proportion of larvae
developing into queens, as predicted (138). Relatedness also affects caste fate
conﬂict in the social gall aphid Pemphigus obesinymphae (1) (Figure 3g). Aphids
from other clones frequently invade galls. These intruders behave selﬁshly and
parasitize the unrelated host aphids by accelerating their own development into
reproductivestagesratherthandefensivestages.Similarly,nearlyallfemalelarvae
of permanently parasitic ants develop as miniature queens. Here, the cost of acting
selﬁshly again falls on members of the unrelated host’s workforce (83).
In the above examples there is great actual conﬂict, and relatedness can only
partially resolve caste fate conﬂict (Figure 1). A more complete resolution, how-
ever, occurs when larvae are constrained from determining their own caste fate
(Figures 6 and 7). In most social Hymenoptera, including the honey bees, trigo-
nine stingless bees, and army ants discussed above, queens are much larger than
workers and caste is determined by nutrition (18, 140, 144). Hence, adult workers
can coerce immature females to become workers simply by providing them with
insufﬁcient food, thus preventing their development into queens (18, 102, 140).
Similarly, larvae are constrained because they cannot leave their cells or brood
piles in search of additional food, and only in some species can they obtain extra
food through begging (25a, 59a). The result is that few queens are reared in these
species, and that caste fate conﬂict is effectively resolved (25, 112, 126, 145). In
thehoneybee,only0.02%ofthefemalebroodarerearedasqueens(145).Thislow
level is remarkable given that theory has shown that, from an individual perspec-
tive, approximately 56% of all female honey bee larvae would prefer to develop
as queens if they could choose their own fate (Box S1) (Figure 7). Social control
over caste fate is also likely in advanced termites such as the Termitidae, given
that immature forms are fed by workers and that workers differentiate irreversibly
early on in their development (131). As predicted, they never overproduce repro-
ductives (78). In some lower termites, a process of wing pad mutilation has been
suggested to prevent workers from developing into alate sexuals (147). However,
the evidence for this has recently been disputed (64a).
Although adult workers beneﬁt from coercing immatures to develop as work-
ers, there is also selection on developing individuals to evade such coercion. Ev-
idence for such evasion has been found in several taxa (18, 102, 140, 141). In the
trigonine stingless bees, for example, queens are typically reared from larger royal
cells(34).However,insomespecies,includingSchwarzianaquadripunctata(141)23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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(Figure 7), females reared in small cells can evade their intended worker fate and
become “dwarf” queens (141) (Figure 3c,d). Although dwarf queens can success-
fully head colonies, they may have lower fecundity than normal queens and are
sometimes eliminated by the workers (102, 141). This reduces the beneﬁt of this
reproductive strategy (134) and explains why in Schwarziana bees only 0.6% of
the females reared in worker cells develop into dwarf queens (141). Small micro-
gyneorwinglessintermorphicqueensarealsooccasionallyproducedinsomeants
(18, 52, 108), and in two species, Harpagoxenus sublaevis and Leptothorax sp.
A, their production is under individual genetic rather than environmental control
(52). This demonstrates a degree of self-determination and suggests that caste fate
conﬂictmayunderlietheirproduction.Queenminiaturizationalsoallowsparasitic
ants who enter colonies of other species to develop as queens even when reared on
an amount of food that is meant to produce only workers in the host (83). Finally,
anotherstrategytoevadecoercionoccursintwogeneraofstinglessbees,Leurotrig-
onaandFrieseomelitta.Here,femalelarvaecanselﬁshlydevelopasqueensbycon-
sumingthefoodprovisionofaneighboringcell(34).Theseexamplesillustratethat,
althoughcastefateconﬂictistypicallywellresolved,tracesofconﬂictcanbefound.
CONFLICTS AMONG TOTIPOTENT INDIVIDUALS
Basis for Conﬂict
In many social Hymenoptera, including Polistinae and Stenogastrinae wasps and
HalictidaeandAllodapinibees,queen-workerdimorphismiseitherweakorabsent
(84, 120, 144). In these, all or most females are “totipotent,” i.e., they have the
ability to mate and produce both male and female offspring. Totipotency also
occurs in approximately 100 species of Ponerinae ants that have secondarily lost
the queen caste and that have colonies headed by one or more mated workers
(“gamergates”) (76). Totipotency greatly increases the potential for conﬂict, as it
allowsanyindividualinthecolonytoreplacetheexistingqueen(76,77),tobecome
an additional queen (67), or, except in Ponerinae ants and epiponine Polistinae
wasps, to found a nest independently (103). The relatedness beneﬁts for females
to mate and breed are similar to those of becoming a morphologically specialized
queen (see above). That is, in the face of reproductive competition with sisters,
a female beneﬁts if she becomes a breeder and produces offspring (sons and
daughters,r = 0.5)ratherthanaworkerrearingtheless-relatedoffspringofsisters
(nephews and nieces, r = 0.375) (76, 77). Actual conﬂict can result in an excess
of females attempting to mate and breed (67), in females attempting to overthrow
the existing queen (76, 77), or, in annual societies, in females leaving the colony
early in order to enter diapause to found a colony the next year (104, 116, 146).
Is There Actual Conﬂict?
There is extensive evidence for actual conﬂict over reproduction in societies of
totipotent females. In polygynous swarm-founding epiponine wasps, an excess of23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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females mate to be readopted in the natal nest when colonies have few mother
queens left (55, 94, 120). The excess then reduces via queen-queen competition
or active elimination by workers (92). Evidence of excess individuals attempting
to mate and breed comes from the queenless ponerine ants Harpegnathos saltator
(67) and Gnamptogenys menadensis (44, 76). Attempts by high-ranking workers
(hopeful reproductives) to overthrow the existing breeder have been observed in
thequeenlessantDinoponeraquadriceps(74,77).Evidencethatfemalesinannual
societies leave the colony early to become a queen the next year comes from the
sweat bee Halictus rubicundus (146) and the paper wasps Polistes annularis (116)
and Polistes fuscatus (104).
Conﬂict Resolution
Both relatedness and coercion can resolve conﬂict in totipotent societies. Related-
ness is important in that it reduces potential conﬂict. For example, theory predicts
that higher relatedness reduces the incentive for individuals to join a hierarchy
of nonworking hopeful reproductives (75) or, in annual societies, to leave the
colony early (104). Relatedness alone, however, is only partially effective. In the
queenless ant D. quadriceps,a ninclusive ﬁtness model predicted that about ﬁve
workers should join a hierarchy of dominants if they are nieces of each other
(r = 0.375) but that only four should do so if they are full-sisters (r = 0.75) (74).
Hence, although relatedness diminishes the conﬂict, it does not reduce it down to
zero.
More effective conﬂict resolution occurs if individuals can be coerced not to
breed. Such coercion can take on various forms. In D. quadriceps ants, workers
cannotbepreventedfromjoiningadominancehierarchy.However,thebetaworker
frequently challenges the alpha (the mated breeding female) and attempts to over-
throw her in the hope of heading the colony (77). Such overthrow is prevented
by a form of policing (77). If the beta challenges the alpha, the alpha smears the
pretender with a pheromone (77). This induces low-ranking workers to punish the
pretenderbyimmobilizingherforaprolongedperiodthatkillsherorcausesherto
lose her high rank and thereby prevents her from legitimately replacing the alpha
at a later date (Figure 2g).
A similar and idiosyncratic form of coercion occurs in the queenless ant Dia-
camma(91)(Figure2h).Here,allworkerseclosewithapairofthoracicappendages
called gemmae that are somehow required for mating (76, 91). However, unless
an ew breeder is needed, the gemmae of newly eclosed workers are bitten off by
nestmatessothatnoworkergetsachancetobreedunlessthecolonyrequiresit(76,
91). In two other queenless ants, H. saltator and G. menadensis, immobilization
also occurs (44, 67) but prevents the colony, which typically has several queens,
from acquiring too many breeders (Figure 2f).
Evidence that females are aggressively prevented from mating also exists (20,
45).IntheallodapinebeeExoneurarobusta,dominantmotherscanpreventfemales
from mating by rejecting those that have been in contact with foreign males (20).
In annual societies, however, such a mechanism may only be partially effective, as23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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it cannot prevent females from breeding by leaving the nest completely to become
a queen the next year (104, 116, 146).
Another form of coercion in conﬂicts among totipotent individuals is social
contracts, which are thought to be important in favoring the cofounding of nests
when there is inequality among the foundresses (103). Dominants, it is argued,
should offer a sufﬁciently large reproductive share to the subordinate, lest the sub-
ordinatewouldleavetofoundherownnest(103).Thereiscurrentlylittleevidence,
however, that social contracts are used in social insects (27, 35). Recent data from
the allodapine bee Exoneura nigrescens, for example, were more consistent with
reproductive shares arising from selﬁsh competition (66).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Amajorfactorinconﬂictresolutioniskinship,withgreaterrelatednessdecreasing
the incentive for selﬁshness. Thus, even when female larvae can choose their own
caste fate, they are not all selected to become queens (Box S1). Similarly, even
if worker-laid eggs are not policed, not all workers should lay eggs instead of
working. In a colony with a single, once-mated queen, approximately 14% to 20%
of female brood are expect to become excess queens and a similar proportion of
workers are expected to lay eggs (Box S1). Societies with these proportions exist,
such as Melipona bees and Polistes chinensis wasps, and are successful, showing
that insect colonies can function even under these levels of conﬂict (36).
Nevertheless, most conﬂicts are reduced to even lower levels. The honey bee is
a clear example. Multiple mating by the queen results in low relatedness among
the female offspring, and kinship alone favors approximately half the female lar-
vaet od evelop into queens or to lay eggs rather than work (Box S1). Yet honey
bee colonies do not rear excess queens as do Melipona, and less than 0.1% of the
workers have active ovaries. The very effective resolution of these conﬂicts is due
to coercion and constraints. Larvae are constrained from developing into queens
unlessgivenspecialadditionalfoodbytheworkers.Adultworkersareconstrained
fromproducingmalesbecauseofeffectivepolicingofworker-laideggs(Figure2).
Multiple mating by the queen also reduces potential worker-queen conﬂict over
sex allocation, as it results in a close alignment of the queen and worker optima.
Multiple mating does cause potential conﬂict over queen rearing, but extensive
research over the past 20 years has failed to ﬁnd evidence of strong nepotism
in queen rearing. Thus, of the three signiﬁcant potential conﬂicts that exist, two
(male rearing and female caste fate) have been resolved largely by coercion com-
bined with constraint and one (queen rearing) probably through informational
constraints.
There are important differences among the various conﬂicts in if and how they
are resolved. Conﬂict over queen rearing could be called the conﬂict that does
not occur, inasmuch as there is little evidence for actual conﬂict despite strong
potential conﬂict in species with multiple queens or a multiply mated queen.
Caste fate conﬂict is the conﬂict that is almost always resolved, because workers23 Nov 2005 16:28 AR ANRV263-EN51-24.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: KUV
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can usually police the caste development of female larvae. However, the rearing of
excess queens in Melipona bees and dwarf queens in S. quadripunctata and other
stingless bees, and possibly also in ants, shows that the conﬂict does exist and can
become actual when circumstances allow larvae power to choose their own fate.
Male production is a conﬂict that is frequently resolved, such that very few work-
ers lay eggs, but signiﬁcant male production by workers occurs in many species.
Resolution of this conﬂict depends on policing by the queen and by other workers.
Sex-allocation conﬂict is often unresolved, with both queen and workers typically
having some power to manipulate colony sex ratios. Only when one party is pow-
erless is the conﬂict resolved, with the sex ratio favoring that of the controlling
party. Conﬂicts are perhaps least resolved in societies with totipotent individu-
als, in which the incentives and opportunities to compete over reproduction are
greatest.
The large body of theoretical and empirical work has provided a good overall
understandingoftheexpressionandresolutionofconﬂictsininsectsocieties.This
work has been central to our current understanding of kin selection theory (17, 28,
40,61,139).Futureworkwillnodoubtdiscoverinterestingnewconﬂictoutcomes
and resolutions, and a number of exciting new research directions are emerging.
Fore xample, only recently has it been established that conﬂict resolution via
coercion can lead to counter-strategies, as in the anarchistic and parasitic honey
bees (5, 69) and dwarf queens in stingless bees (141), where individuals have
found ways to escape social control. Other such strategies may well be discovered
in the future. On the theoretical side, models are increasingly considering the
subtle ways in which different conﬂicts may interact or arms races may proceed
(41,105,106).Empirically,westillneedabetterunderstandingoftheinformation
used in the recognition decisions central to manipulation of colony reproduction
(Box S2). Studies have begun to analyze the chemicals present in insect colonies,
but the challenge is to develop elegant bioassays that identify biologically active
compounds. Finally, we know almost nothing of the genes affecting conﬂict in
socialinsects(butseeReference65foranexception).Researchonmicroorganisms
shows that genetics can play a role in conﬂict resolution (42) and that the multi-
locus genetics of the syndrome may help select against anarchy in honey bees
(5). Recent genetic studies have also suggested that intragenomic conﬂicts could
interact with the expression of intracolony conﬂict (137, 142), and this would
certainly be an interesting avenue for future research. Finally, progress is being
made on genome sequencing and transcriptional proﬁling, and RNA interference
has now been performed on the honey bee (107). This work should ultimately
provideanewperspectiveonconﬂictresolutionbyallowingresearcherstoidentify
genes involved in conﬂict and compare them across species.
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Box S1 The effect of relatedness on conflict resolution in insect societies 
Inclusive fitness theory (40) can be used to determine the optimum reproductive 
strategies for individuals in male production and female caste conflict (108, 109, 
112). That is, whether to attempt to reproduce directly or to work. The analysis de-
termines the ESS (evolutionarily stable) (71) proportion which should work when 
coercion against attempted reproduction does not occur so that cost to kin is the 
only factor limiting direct reproduction and hence resolving the conflict. Concern-
ing male production by workers, the ESS ratio of reproductive to sterile workers in 
a queenright colony is 
[Rs-Rm] reproductive workers   to    [Rf+Rm] sterile workers 
where Rs, Rf and Rm are the (life-for-life) relatedness coefficients (10) of workers to 
sons, sisters and males reared in the colony (109). The inclusive fitness benefit to a 
worker from reproducing is to replace an average male (value Rm) by a son (value 
Rs), which gives (Rs-Rm). The benefit of becoming a sterile worker is to increase 
colony productivity, which entails both queen (value Rf) and male production (value 
Rm), which gives (Rf+Rm). The ratio gives an ESS proportion of workers that should 
reproduce of (Rs-Rm)/(Rf+Rs). At the ESS reproductive and non-reproductive work-
ers have equal inclusive fitness (109). In large colonies, the algebra becomes very 
simple because unpoliced worker reproduction will result in workers’ sons domi-
nating male production so that workers rear mainly nephews. In addition, if the ma-
jority of males in the population are workers’ sons, male reproductive value is in-
creased (10) so that the relatedness of workers to nephews and sisters is equal 
(Rm=Rf) and relatedness to sons is 1 (Rs=1). This gives ESS proportions of egg-
laying workers of 14%, 33%, and 54% (109) for relatednesses among workers of 
0.75, 0.5, and 0.3, corresponding to paternity frequencies of 1, 2 and 10. These re-
sults confirm the basic prediction that low relatedness causes greater potential con-
flict. A similar analysis of caste fate conflict for swarm-founding species (108, 112) 
showed that individual females should develop into queens versus workers in a ra-
tio of 
[1-Rf] queens   to    [Rf+Rm] workers 
Again, this represents the relative inclusive fitness of the alternative strategies. The 
strategy of becoming a queen has a direct benefit (1-Rf) but becoming a worker has 
an indirect benefit in terms of increased colony productivity (Rf+Rm), giving an ESS 
proportion of workers developing into queens of (1-Rf)/(1+Rm) (112). Thus, in stin-
gless bees, where the mother queen is singly mated (Rf=0.75), between 14% and 
20% of the larvae should develop as queens, depending on whether the males are 
workers' sons (Rm=0.75) or the queen’s sons (Rm=0.25) (90, 112). In the honeybee, 
however, queens mate with approximately 10 males, so that Rf=0.3 and almost all 
males are the queen’s sons so that Rm≅0.25. Thus, the ESS in honeybees in the ab-
sence of coercion is for 56% of all female larvae to develop into queens (112). The Supplemental Material: Annu. Rev. Entomol. 2006. 51: 581-608 
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above results are based on the assumption that colony-level costs scale linearly with 
the proportion of individuals that act selfishly by attempting to reproduce directly. 
This assumption can easily be relaxed (109, 112). However, the general result is 
unaltered. Greater kinship results in fewer individuals following the selfish strategy 
of direct reproduction versus working, and in all cases a large proportion of indi-
viduals should adopt the selfish strategy (109, 112).  
 
 
 
 
 
Box S2 Information and conflict resolution 
Information often affects the outcome of reproductive conflicts because exercising 
power in a conflict situation frequently involves discrimination among kin (5). For 
example, workers must recognize the sex of larvae to manipulate sex allocation, 
recognize whether an egg is laid by the queen or a worker to police worker-laid 
eggs, and recognize full-sister and half-sister queens in order to favor the full-
sisters. Recognition need not be perfect but the better the information the fewer the 
errors and the greater the advantage. If errors are sufficiently high then the costs of 
discrimination can outweigh the benefits (59, 91). Individuals subject to discrimina-
tion may be selected to conceal, advertize or mimic information. Thus, a queen 
honey bee is selected to advertize that her eggs are queen-laid (86) because workers 
should favor queen-laid eggs if they can recognize them as workers are more re-
lated to brothers (0.25) than nephews (0.15). But egg-laying workers will benefit if 
they can lay eggs that mimic queen-laid eggs as this will increase egg survival (69, 
86). Male larvae may be selected to mimic female larvae and to conceal their male-
ness in order to increase their chances of being reared (78, 79). Depending on the 
context, conflict resolution may result from either good information (low errors) or 
poor information. If police workers have good information they can easily dis-
criminate between worker-laid eggs and queen-laid eggs. This will make policing 
more effective, select for fewer workers to lay eggs and help to resolve the conflict 
over male production (108, 109, 111). If workers have poor information to recog-
nize full-sister and half-sister queens then discrimination in queen rearing is not fa-
vored (87) and the conflict over queen rearing is resolved. If the workers have good 
information concerning the sex of young brood this will make manipulating the sex 
ratio easier and could lead to the conflict being resolved close to the worker opti-
mum, provided that there are sufficient female larvae available to rear additional 
queens (82). Conversely, poor information would make manipulation of the sex ra-
tio costly and lead to a resolution close to the queen optimum. The information use-
ful in different contexts almost certainly varies greatly in quality. Thus, discrimina-
tion between full-sister and half-sister queens must use phenotypic odors based on 
underlying heritable variation (87), and requires discriminatory workers to use their 
own odor as a referent with which to compare queens. The information available is 
almost certainly insufficient to recognize full- versus half-sisters accurately (7, 87). 
Discrimination between worker-laid eggs and queen-laid eggs could be very accu-
rate if queens marked their eggs with a special pheromone (69, 86), provided that 
workers did not mimic this (4). 
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Table S1 Queen and worker policing in the social Hymenoptera  
Policing can be carried out by the queen or workers, and can occur via either ag-
gression (A) or egg-eating (E) or both. When police workers were observed to re-
produce, policing is indicated as being selfish (113), i.e. driven by direct repro-
ductive motives. In bumblebees, there are anecdotal observations of workers eat-
ing other workers' eggs and queen's eggs (12, 13, 27, 31-33, 50, 52, 56, 57, 67, 98, 99, 
103, 105). However, egg eating is probably not discriminatory, and so this is not 
considered worker policing. 
TAXON 
   Species 
Queen  
policing 
(A/E) 
Worker  
policing 
(A/E) 
Worker  
policing  
selfish? 
References 
ANTS        
   Acromyrmex echinatior  no yes  (E)  no
a (20) 
   Aphaenogaster cockerelli  no  yes (A)  no data  (51) 
   Aphaenogaster senilis  no yes  (A)  yes
b (64) 
   Aphaenogaster smythiesi   no  yes (A)  no data  (54) 
   Camptonotus floridanus  no data  yes (E)  no data  (21) 
   Crematogaster smithii  yes
c (E)  no    (44, 47) 
   Diacamma sp.  yes (E)  yes (A+E)  no data  (60, 77) 
   Dinoponera quadriceps yes  (A+E)  no    (75,  76) 
   Eutetramorium mocquerysi  yes (A+E)  no    (45) 
   Formica fusca  no  yes (E)  no data  (48, 49) 
   Gnamptogenys menadensis  no yes  (A)  no  (34,  35) 
   Harpegnathos saltator  no yes  (A)  no  (66) 
   Leptothorax acervorum  yes (E)  no    (9, 41) 
   Lordomyrma sp. yes  (A)  no    (16) 
   Odontomachus rixosus  yes (E)  no data    (53) 
   Odontomachus simillimus  yes (E)  no data    (104) 
   Pachycondyla inversa  no  yes (E)  no data  (18) 
   Platythyrea punctata  no yes
d (A)  no data  (43) 
   Protomognathus americanus  yes (A)  yes (A)  yes
b  (8, 22, 30, 46) 
       
WASPS (VESPINAE)       
   Dolichovespula arenaria  yes (A+E)  no data    (37, 38) 
   Dolichovespula maculata  yes (A+E)  yes (A+E)  yes?
e (37) 
   Dolichovespula media  yes (E)  no data    (26) 
   Dolichovespula norwegica  yes (A+E)  (yes, but rare)  no data  (1) 
   Dolichovespula saxonica  yes (E)   yes
f (A+E)  no data  (24, 26) 
   Dolichovespula sylvestris  yes (A+E)  yes (A+E)  yes
g (113,  114) 
   Vespa crabro  no  yes (E)  no data  (23) 
   Vespula acadica  yes (A)  no data    (93) 
   Vespula atropilosa  no yes  (A+E?)  no  (38,  63) 
   Vespula rufa  yes (A+E)  (yes, but rare)  yes
h (107) 
   Vespula vulgaris no  yes  (E)  no  (25,  115) 
       
WASPS (POLISTINAE)       
   Polistes biglumis  no data  yes (E)  yes?
e (74) 
   Polistes chinensis  yes (A+E)  yes (E)  yes
g  (94, 101, 102) 
   Polistes dominulus  yes (E)  yes (E)  yes
g (65,  85) 
   Parachartergus smithii  yes (E)  no data    (2) Supplemental Material: Annu. Rev. Entomol. 2006. 51: 581-608 
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HONEYBEES        
   Apis cerana no  yes  (E)  no
a (80) 
   Apis florea no  yes  (E)  no
a (39) 
   Apis mellifera capensis no  yes
d (E)  no data  (83) 
   Apis mellifera mellifera,  
   A. m. ligustica or hybrid 
no yes  (A+E)  no
a  (58, 70, 73, 81, 88, 89, 
92, 95, 106) 
   Apis mellifera scutellata  no yes  (E)  no
a  (28, 68, 83) 
       
STINGLESS BEES        
   Melipona bicolor  yes (E)  yes (E)  yes
g  (61, 62, 105) 
   Melipona compressipes  yes (E)  no    (96) 
   Melipona scutellaris  yes (E)  no    (100) 
   Scaptotrigona depilis  yes (E)  no    (19) 
   Scaptotrigona postica  yes (E)  no    (6) 
       
BUMBLEBEES        
   Bombus agrorum  yes (A)  no    (12, 13, 31)  
   Bombus ardens  yes (A+E)  no    (57) 
   Bombus atratus  yes (A+E)  no    (97) 
   Bombus ephippiatus  yes (E)  no    (3) 
   Bombus hypocrita  yes (A+E)  no    (56) 
   Bombus ignitus  yes (A)  no    (55) 
   Bombus impatiens  yes (E)  no    (17) 
   Bombus lapidarius  yes (A+E)  no    (33, 50, 52, 67, 98, 99) 
   Bombus ruderatus  yes (A+E)  no    (84) 
   Bombus terrestris  yes (A+E)  no    (103, 105) 
       
SWEAT BEES        
   Lasioglossum zephyrum  yes (A+E)  no    (11, 14, 15, 36, 72) 
 
aJudged from the extreme rarity of workers with active ovaries in queenright colonies. 
bOnly reproductive workers ag-
gress each other. 
cHas a subcaste of large workers morphologically specialized to lay unfertilized eggs (44). Because 
many of these worker-laid eggs were eaten by the queen, these eggs were initially thought to have a purely trophic func-
tion (44). However, a later genetic study (47) showed that a significant proportion of the adult males were workers' sons, 
implying that many of the eggs were in fact viable. Hence, egg eating by the queen is probably best interpreted as queen 
policing. 
dWorkers police female eggs laid by other workers, produced by thelytokous parthenogenesis. 
eAuthors refer to 
competitive oviposition and oophagy among workers, implying that worker policing was probably selfish. 
fPrimarily in 
multiple paternity colonies. 
gWorkers replace other workers' eggs. 
hIn two out of the eight cases where a worker policed a 
worker-laid egg (107), the policing worker laid an egg soon after (1). 
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